Memofor DCI

The War in Vietnam

9 January 1967

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE: JAN 2005

(b) (3)

C1~11TBAL I~T~LLlGBNCE AGEUCT

OFFIcE ~ EAZLO~IAL ~iT~ES

9Jaw13z7396T

~E DXR~1~

SUB~ThLT: The i~ In T1~tniaci

~Z ~3TLCOX IU ~&L

L Irz the c~se ot the past year a~ a halt the ~an~e3

that the C~ists~ adn Smith Vietnam ~ ~wi1itaxy ~1ctory

have vanished. ~iiz is the clearest devela~ent of the perica;

in other respects the c~se of the struggle rc~vi.1n~ incai~c3nsive.

In Saigon -the political health of the S~th Vietr~ese Govern

pent is ctfll pzecari~s though ich better than it iias a eer

ago. The p~o~ for pacification of the co nti~ys1de has ~e

s~ progress, hat results ccaitlnne to be spott~y. The figbtirgg

capabilities at the So~zth Vi~t,w~~se exz~r r~~4~1 geflera.~13r ~r,

en~ its event~3. usefulness in paciflcatiaa re~ins ~mcertain.

The sy~pathies at c~ of the nan-Cu~~nist world, and th~ efforts.

of~ non-.c~mtst goverz~auts, are more concex~ed. vith

stopping ~the ~ar than with the tercs for aettle~nt T~zere

is ~D evid~ ~4~ttiun of the C~or~m1st capability to

eonttmze the stxugjIe. In a~ case, there is mo evideii~e of a

~1mnr!ition of c~~~t viii to continue the war.

2, The matter of vii]. is crucial. Famot a aeter~1nation

px~babl~y 15 ctxeng~anad by bopes that the 1~ -will lose heart if

the struggle is prolonged and by Ito belief that So~zth Viet~

eaw~ot create a vi~b~ political str~tuze capable of wir~~~g

~SS tupport. - the strains upon the C~in4~t side are

gzeat and era ine~eÆsing. Above all, probably, the C~rr~irt~tS

face probl~ in recruiting manpower of go~-d quality within

Soath T1etn~,-

ifl preserving the ~ra].e of forces vhieh

have been di pointed of quick victory and must c~ntiuuØ the

struggle un&r Increasingly diffien].t circumstances.

3. 1~e do not ~v how long the Cunists vi.U xe~aiz~

determined to persist. There are a~ in~1cationo that they

may be reviewbig their strategy and pondering their prospects.

-2-

~e~ decUe ~ s~ pd.nt, perhai~is even at a fai.r]3 ear3~

date tz tapez ~ff tie c~flcft, ~ e eiv~b1y ~. enter int3

neg~t~ati~ns. We see n~ g~3d~ reason t3 believe that such a

decisi~ is ltke]y in the near fu.t~e~ th~gh it c~u1d happen

sith i~tt1e prior vaini~. At present, ye thi~ the on3~ ~à~e

eati~ate is tbst the ctxuggLe, it it is a~d at the creation.

of a leaeeful South Vis~se state ~bich can ~ta~ on it~ ~n

feet, viii still be 3.~ aM c~st3y.

Ii. In the fDilovi~g paragraphs ye d1scus~ various aspects

of the sit~ation in greater aetan,

3

S-~-C ~-&T

T~E MULaAI~~

5. Certain tt-~s, ~ahieh vere a)xea~y appa~nt In late

1965, ~ere coa~i~a duriÆg 2,966. The ca~ability of the Cc~

~mi.~t m~1~ force to e~et offensive mUitaxy operat1on~ ~aa

b1i~ted, vbile the t~ and Allied forces ~aanaI~1y gained the

battlefield i~it5zttwe. C~1~t ~n force imits uere ~anled

tii~ i~ e~p_i~ b~ the Inreasi~y effective wseerth ~

twtics of the l~ ClI~!rn.rf~ Ca~ntst ~eparat~S for major

init.izt~.ves have been repeatedly spoiled by a c~b~nation of co~

Xtcld intelligence and quick rcepca~e capabilities. C~~t

forces suffered heavy losses fr~ the c~nb$.ne& tire power of US

ettflery a~ tactical air suppcxrt

6. ~evertbe1e~s, the N~A/VC ~ forces r~ra~n In the

field. Dr~rIng 1966 the total strength of these forces ir~crØased

fr~ about 83,000 to io6,00o, large2y because of the heav-jr inp~xt

of men fr~ the Zorth. There is so reaz~ to doubt that the

present force level can be sustained, if ~j chooses. .M 1~r

as materiel is oancerned, capabilities for transporting sup~1ies

to the ~1n forces heve been ~e than adequate and ieU above

requirements.

4-

Cc5~mist I~ilitary~actics in the ~Text Phase

7. There is consiüerable evidence that the ~flitary

develoc~euts of the past ~ee.r bave lea the Cr~rnn4~ts to ze

re.ise their stx~te~ eM tactics. Probab2y because they

rec~iz~ that ~ o~itrtgbt militaxy Tictoxy is inpossible, 1tb~

appear to be a&justing their military effort pr .rily wit~ a

vie~i to sustA1nj1~ a long ear. Their. ob3ectivea in the cca~iug

phase i~il1 probably be to achieve a ~e favorable ratio of

attrition rates ~ aaoi&thg ]srge-scale battles in favor of

nu~rous, v~Ae1y disperse3 ~11-imit actions, to harass eM

obstruct the 1~/GV~ pacification program to raise the cost of

the banbiDg pro~a~, aM, in general, to create an inpression

that real. pa-ogress, let alone vict.ozy, is inpossible for t1~e 1~.

Eanoi appears to believe, in the light of its reeking of the

American boa3r politic, that ~ricen will to persist iiufl ~ot

prove equal to a protractea and costly struggle.

8. The Bole at the Kain Forces During the phase iibich the

struggle is nou entering, the Coiists ~uU gl~ost certainly

atteL~pt to keep m*3or el~euts of their main force, including the

IIVA ~1~ts, in the field. Th~r principal o3ions viii be to

5-

~E~Q 11-1.1

protect bese aress an~ to force the W ax~ AB7JI to Eaintain large

forces dispersed sn~ in actia~ 1~4n~t this threat. Large~scs1e

attacks i~l3~l a~st certainly. be la~mth~ whenever condittłns

e~ear to a~gar success, aed espeeidfly when such an at~ck holes

$~ pr~se at baviag en i~ortant ~jt~ effect on the IS.

Swtained 1ar~e~it cperat2cu~s, however, aeen likely to c~tinne

to ~ as the C~ists seek to c~xt the rate of cd.LritiO~

on the forces. ~his co~ad ~an that it will be ~e difficult

for IS fQrces to a~1ke ls~ge eneny coneerztrations with search

arid destro~ -ations.

9 In order to ace mpU~b these aims, it is not necessary

for the ~in fOrces to ez greatly. It is possible that Banal

pl~ to slav down the e~ansian of inq~in force units, especially

If there Is to be ~eater ~asts ~ guerrilla tac~tIcs. This

could result in a decline Is the introd~action of corplete imita

of the Barth Tie~se Ar~ into South~ There are s~e

sigus that this ~,y already be taking place. Since 2. July no new

units have bean identified; however, because of the time leg

~ihicb often oc~zs between actual Infiltration and confii~1on

by US intelligence, It j~ still too early to say that a decline

-6-

has occurred. In a~ event, Jorth Vietn~ viii ~5ix~t certain]~r

have to sei~ siceab1~ ~aps of re~iiacemeut pes~n~ into the

South in order to ~1nteisi exist ug BVA nein force units at

eæequate strex~gth.

10. The Role of the CuerrU.les The next yeer is ~l~4y

to witness an increased ~phasia ~ the gu.eirflla war. Thu vax,

at course, ne~~ though it was co~ucted at a sanewhat

lo~aer level this ast y~. ~ strategists appa3~eut3y new

believe that intensified g*zezTtlla operntic~s offer the best

prcepect of countering the Impact of the US mtiita~y buildup.

The missions of the gae~U1& forces viii probably emphasize

baxTassn~nt at the bases WCs of the US ~VN forces in

order to ~in doun these farces in de:t~ive operations aed,

secondly, disruption at the pacification pro~ran by attacks on

security forces assigned to 1W, on RD cadres, and on pacified

Esniets. To a~iMeve these goats, sore VC main force units may 1,e

C.

diverted to guerrilla opeiaticns, and the YC ~- make evon more

intensive efforts to motivate the population ~er its control.

In eddition, the Ccsists idli e~nost cert~vin3y attempt forther -

spectaculax&? such as the mortaring of najor airfields and US

-7-

)

Suppi7 ae~ots. &~h o~exations vbich involve re1ative3~ little

ris]~, cci~mit ~ev assets a~, if succesalul, D.c311.eve ~cajox Ziolitical

and p~oa effects.

11. ibe C-.-~-~.sts ~1ll continue aM ~rdbab3y step t~p

whet has be~ te~d the ~n~1 iier of ~~,,~tsinatio~i ana

tex2vriszn. Iu the pr34~y~cea B~Qh t~ittY hes al1~y5 bean coe

0! the C..,rn.mt~tS prlncip3l means Of at a~king the local roots

0! central ~thortty and of cowing the rural pop~.lation. The.

recent assassination of Constituent Asse~b2y nember Tran Van Van

and the attempt on Dr. Ph~ Qn~g Dan suggests that the Crzm~~iir4sts

Z~3 be ~w1arkbg on an intensifled ca~a1Rjt of ~Utan teo?i5n.

be ~of a can,~aiga ~er present cixvum~tances v

,~ould ectuafl~ be e a sign of C~~st vca~ess then of ctrengt2

(xaliy, urban assets ~oula be saved for the final p~sh to toj~p2e

a govei~ent softe~ by m1ltta~r defeat.) The C ni!tS ixa~r

feel,~ t~t po3it1ca3]~ and psycbo].ogical.],yr tbe7 nuat

cowpensate f~ battlefield x~w~rees end, further, that by care

tuU,y se].acting their iaz~sts, th~ C~.cerbate regional tensicE

i~ithin the V1etn~ese boay poittic and fan alreaay .ex1stiu~

suspicion end hosttility ~nnr~g contending uon-Cc~m.I.I at politicisn~

and factions.

-8-

22. A TC eff~~rt to press the guerr!3la ~ar ~ifl p~e a

~ t~b~.1l~rige f~ the allied forces, espee1a]i~ s1nC~ the

strenF~th oX the Irregulars ~ have been ~erest~ted I~i the

pest. Por s~e ~rears it has been estimated that the.te ~iere.

about l00,000-120,000 I ze~Aar , hat there is noci docu~ieutaz7

~uideitee whith st~~g17 suggests that at the beg1,~M~~g oX 2965,

irregular streugth was aboc~t 200,000 ~ that the goal for the

end oX 1965 yes 250,000-300,000. )(ore recent doc~ntar7

evidence su~sts t~t this goal was prdb~b2y reached, at least

doing 1966.

Cmist Pxobl~ end Pros~ects

23. caneovei Though we ~ have erred In ~z~ees~Inating

the size of the Irregular force, this Is not to say that the

C~iists are free of ~n.mver problems. The hee~y losses suffered

b.y the C~mzudst forces are a continlth3g borden, parti~li?r1~ ~

the Viet Cong. Total losses for 19~6 were about l2b,0O0~ fn~di~

~/ Irregulars are divided Into full-time guera-122es, pat-timemilitia, and secret guerrillas who operate ~naestIne]y.

gf A statistical analysis of menpouer ~,rob1ems is inhibited byserious de~ieieneies In the available data. The three vital

me~s~es or mni~io~er are estI~tes of losses, the lnvel ofInX5.].txztiou fr~ the Ucrth, and the Order of Battle. The

large areas at ~certaizzty ~hich~ each of these !veTIn~its mean that the 3ud~ents and estites based a themrest cu an inadeq~mte factiaal imderpinnlng and are thussubject to sI,gnltLcant changes as more I~orznatian i~ obtaIne~}everthe]ess, the statistics do permit judgements on~ majortrends.

-9-

65,000-75,000 1~t to the ~vA/VC ii~2n forces. Ag~inst its o~n

losses of. 30,000-35,000, bcwever Borth Vietnea ~as able to

sustain en biput of ~boirt 75,000. Anfi ~s noted abo~e, the VC

i~ego1ar force uas ~dbabZr e,~Mtng to 250,000-300,000, as

wc3l as i~-4ng up for cu~bat losses is. its oun and in Viet Cong

n fo~ce u~tts.

1~i. During 1967, se esti~te that the Tint Cong recraiting

and training apparatus will be reqizizea to snpp2~ about 7,000-

10,000 personnel per month. The YC are ea~uab1e of this effort~,

but it is probab]7 c1n~e to their~ capability. Of this

tote.l requi~~nt about 3,C00~I,O00 sill be earz~rked for replace

~ts in ~n~fit fOrce ~ts. This ~n be done, but upgrading irregula

at this rate soeld probab1~y mean a decline in the que1i1~r of re

p1acent~nts sent to the $~4~ Porces. The ]Zorth Vietnamese, hczi~rei,

ee~ to buve been ~re successful in meeting their nanpo~er require

ments in 1966 then tbey~ here in 1965.

15. There is alxeaªy evidence that c~etition for ~anpo~ier

usa creating ~irob]~ during 1966. A staff officer or the TO 5th

division, for ei~p~, stated that his diiisioiz ~.as having

difficulties in keeping up to strength beca~we of leek of adequate

- 10 -

rep1ac~ents.. aivtsio~ ~ias v.sin~ ~orth Vietx~se fis re-.

p1ace~nezxts, thc*zgh ~e ~eorJ]d no~1y expect u~greded g~e~r1l1as

~ local dre.ftees to be nore thez~ adequate as rep].acecezxts for

the YC 14a1n purees k recently ca.~t~vd d4~nt also indicates

s~ heZd-~S3ed ~errLUa cc~andars ~eze tci~g sub~terruge

to ~.re~nt ~Err~ii~s fr~ being assi~ed to~ force imita.

16. ~i )~ora1e is 14~.1y to be a ~e critical

factor than in the past. Ve kz~ov that in ~euera3. Viet Coflg ~rØ1e

is 3.ess good than a ~ear ago, ~ reas~s 1n~1~e the aefeats and

haras~ents resulting ~ superior ~ fixe~ower and ~zobi1t~r and

good tactical iute]li~enee; s~e var i arinec~s accentuated by the

dininisbing r~ospects of a~ foreseeable end to the var; the ~

po~ier ~i.n~h vhich has foreed the VC to send. recruits to ~1n

force imits ft~ their ~ti~e De3~a habitat into the inhospitable

and disease infested 1ij~1c~mt$; food end ~diciae shorta~es.

2~one of thece ~poTIer or morale pzobl~is is I 1~ri~1y to be

signiticant]y alleviated in a ~otracted var, assuming ~S~AR(E

end Korean forces ~T~*~1n p~ess~es on YC base areas and ~in

force i~nits.

11

-SI-

iT. There is b~nd to be s~e sensc of a loss of n~omerzt~,

which c~1d have an i~ortant bearing on the attitudes of officers

and cadres ubo were lea to believe that vieto~ uas i~ot far off.

M~ pextaps ~e ~t~~bthare ~y be a ~s3Jcho1o~ica]. i!~ct on

the pe~,p1e. It can be fzt~]. to a ~uerr1l]a novc~ent or a

revo1tio~mr~r ~r it the people decide that the rebe]s ~r ~ot win

after all.. ~ut, as elxe*.y noted, the C~ini~t 7!?1~~fl forces no

1c~ger have the caj~fl1ty of g4~tng the ~1M of Jor tactical

successes ~thith would sustain their n~ent~.

18.. To s~ up the m1lita~ o~xt3.oc4,the focus of the C~

mist effort is 1fl?P1y to be e on ~~11 unit actio~is,

r3risu, sab~a~ and those tactics which pose the cost

difficult cbaflen~e to the allied forces. Is far as ce~abt3.ities

and will axe cOacerz2ed, the C~~i.t sts are e.nc~Lu~terii~e ~tod~~

p?O~en9, but n~e of the~.e appear to be critical. Thus, fron

the pue]y milita~ standpoint there are good. reasons to believe

tba~ the Comists ~1fl persevere.

12

SE-C-Il E T

TE3 P~CAL

19. ~e ~j.iti~1 aspects of the t~r ~ay n~r 1o~a s~that

~re in~rtent to the en~ts as the ~flita~r situation Æsst~~

~xe ~ mxe the ebnza~tex of a ~retractea ana cos.~3,y stu~e..

Th~ O~~t~t tfr~ ~f~ St13.~. ~epe~dz to a gz~at e~teizt

~ t~ ded cabi~ ~ c~utt~eut Of its eathes and their ~~i

~ t~xflita~ ~1l~~ ~tt these 1~ou]~ be of ~ avafl~ vith-.

out the active c~ ~~rced si~p~rt of a ~stantta1 i*r~ o~ttbe

If tbi~ support could be denie~, the Vt~ w~u]4 be

b1ab~ vu].ner~b1e, ao~ ~xdbab]y~ could be driven off into t~e Mfl~

to &tarve or s3.~I1y deteriorate In strc~tb and ~ra1e.

~). The ~i~.mI~tg lost grams In 1966 in terł~ or w1~at tl~

can offer the people. They are likely to 1~se even 2~re gZ~ms1 in.

I~6T. ~ie ~eve1o~czxt of a degree of stability in SaiGon, the

~ or elections, and t~ process of bn~1iTh~g ~iat1~taa3. ix~stitu-.

t1~s beg2n to provide ~ fir&t credible io1ttic~1 alternative

since D~. At the level or ~re particular and 1~~ediate àcmcern

to the vil1a~rs there ~as ~ decl.slve shift, but ~t,be strains ~i

the VC apparatus and tl~ pressure of t~/ABV~T i~il–tax7, p~c1flcatiou~

ct~i1c 8CtiO~3, and. ec3n10 and construction pr~ra~s vera begiEuitz~

13

~E~L

to tell fn particular areas, i~ not genara].3~ t~ougbout South

Vietm!a. YC have been driven reas!ngly to treat the

~io~u1ation ~re hurshly. increased ta~tion, forced recxui~eut,

end less selective acts oX terzgj~ bare hurt the5~ 1~ge as

aeXenaer~ of the peop1e. And associatio~i vith the VC sews in

creas1r~gl~r the ~g path to vbat the TiueaerB vont ~t or all

and security.

21. 2.~ VC ability to defend v1l1a~es agaiflst tE/~R~ThT

attac~s has de~l4~ed, and it has bec~ easing2,y likel~v that

the presence of VC forees in a vfliege will bring do~in a rain of

b~s and g~uif1re. I~ contrast, ~n gove.~nerrt-coctroUed areas

schools are be~ bnfl.t, ~ica1 assistance is avafl.able, ectc

activity Is pos 1N~ there is a degree of h~mSty fr~.both1.ngs

and battles, ~ the sheer veight oX the res~ces available

trucks, cartbn~vers, airplanes suggests tbat this n~ be the

wtmilng sidc. There are, of c~se, nany sboxtcclniEgs ~z the

govcrnent aide,~the pervasive threat of terror~L~ a~a1i

those w120 go ovar or take active roles. B~axtheless, whole

rU1a~es haie ~ved to ~r~it areas, others have been

~actf1ea,~ and recxnits have been X~md E~ the peo~.e t~

take an ac~1ve role in all the tex~izs phases or rev 1uti~ax~r

de~1~ and paeff1eatt~,

22, ~ C~mi~ta xeco~tze the critical

1~portan~e or defeating the pacifteation~ Oter the next

~1: they vfl3. pr~&~17 attenpt to roll back the progr ,3ust

as tbe~y .ro32.ed up Dienc atrategic healets in 1963 vhŁn these

begen to threaten the VO grip ~n s~ parts of the eount~rstde.

~2I~ ittcati~ pr~en dapen~.s on ~n~r factors. not the 3c~ast of

vhieh is the stea~y c~~ti~t ~f the Salaon Go~1,,?!~pt~t. But

in the near te~1 t~ kc3 £~ctor probsb3.y is going to be the

pratecti~ of paei~ aze~, ~ th~ re~t~ to a co~siderab1e

degree on the £~M ~ the B~i~~e3. and Popalar force troops.

23. The Bole of AB~ ~ARVB toda~r is not in good shape.

~n general, its norale Is poor, and its training has iz~roved

~t3.e, ~,1 I~. of its 21 divisi~s are capable of reasonable

~ ~s is ~ijarjj~ because of the v1~e

diversity In the qualities or e*wision level lealershla.

15

2!~.~~RV~ is not n~cess~ri1,y~ to, 1~a~11~e ~fl

its ne~zest role as a sccarity ~zce In the p~cL~isation protr~m4

A sav1n~ el~t In the p~escnt ~it~at1~i Is the presence or

~S and ~LUC tr~ to keep the 1ar~e noin farce w~its o~t the J~RVii&

2nd In ~eneza1 gain n~ tine fox the A~V~ t~ begin ~-etrainirzg

for its ne~ ~sion ~uch viii depend. ~ vhether Sei~pn ~aintains

its Interest and pressure and on ~ the local c~ers resp~nd.

It is likely that perZo~ce viii be spotty ior s~e ti~ and

thnt both aoiXicatlou and .AEVIPs effectivcuess in supyortIn~~ it

viii ~vance only s1~1y.

25. Viot~~~~e P~ticai Deve1op~!e1rzts.* The outlook ~or

contin~ied stcbi.lity in the polities of South Vietn~ seems somevbat

brighter. ~ be sure, fimdauental probl~ remsin and no assurance

can be given that s~ ineldent ndght not provoke a t~&jor crisis.

Over a period of 18 i~ths, ~wever, the 1~ rc~2me has -iiivec~L

.A fuller discussion of the Vietn~e~e politica]. otztloók iscontai~d In B]E 53-66, Problems of Political Develop~entIn South Yi~nam Over the next Yec*r or So,15 Dece~ther 1966, S~C11S1~.

_ 16 -

S~v~r~1 crises of a kind ubith hare brou~t &mn ear]ier xegi~s.

First ste~ ~e been t~zen to~ard creatin~ a sense of nzcticns].

i~ient–ty ansi the 5nstituti~ms to ~b~iy it. Tb~ en1ar~ed tS

presenco has he~ped .~çxeat1y, and despite the danger of ~1pient

~vlll p cti~mc to be a ~ree f~ steLbilit

26. If, as ec~ iTh~I~r South Yict~ noes sake ~re

Pro13ress, pass1ii~ tbr3u~h ~tio~za1 elections during 1361 aM

for~in~ a new ~aw~1.r~nt then this t~m~t help but have en ~act

on ~x)i. Any~in the ~han#~s for or~cr~.y political

in South Viz~ is diSCOUrag–Ti~ to W~ioi partizularly

at a ti~ ~xb~ the ap.port~witj for nilitery victor~ has been

checked. ~{ ~ou2~ be even ~e i~xessed and discouraged if

Saigon also ce~ed to s~ pro~ess in cn~c~-i~j the lr~iya1ties

of the people.

21. Px~ospect.s The outlook ibr the political phase of the.

var is quite ~d. ~ress in pacification and ~imdng over

the popolation is 32~e3~ to coma slo~r1y and paiuuily. ~e

C~mmists ~e~ to wage the politicel battle as vi~Qrouz1T

as the military coirtest. They viii. a2~st certainly allw o~e

u.11s.

afla. pr ily t~ years to de~rtd.~ tl~ s~cess o~ ihefr ~trate~r

lu the next ~. But if the ~ac1flcatizm p~o~r~i ~ves for-.

v~x~d ztead5.]y, ev~ If slouly, a~& Sal.0on contlimes to ~a1n In

th~ the hpa~t on ____ is .1~�ze1y to be fax greater

than ex~ statistic~2. ~asuxes of ~ro~r~ss ~ht s~aggest.

~ 3.8

i~E ~C~fl~G C~ NVN AS A ~c1zoa

28. ~t ~31 ~ab]~ expect f~ther ~ e~ca1ation oX the

b~i~ eM util ta1~ aMitt~s~.L steps to ~kc the ~ oXr attacks

on the Iort~ 1~reani~ costly aM 4tttt~1t. ~ith Soviet aM

Osthese ~aatstsnoe~ 1*n~t be. a3rsaay b~z13t ii~ its at? defease

step by step: ~ Me., $Mb, NIOs, tb~ ~re Mv~ed

)~C., .d.~-to-atx Mashes, hi~zavea rMers, iute~ated i~~-~

5~flt~ ~Lth Cltir$ eM f~I~y~ N~th Korean pilots have ~pearea.

Ve c~cont czł1~ that as the ~ sep to check the t~ be~ing

the Victuancee ~i11 been to ~e ~ii~t yQlauiteers Lu c~bat,

the North Z~~1j beiug the first test of ~ reactions.

29. Zt is not 3~oastr.~e that the bc~ing at North Viets

~ hes tbu~ ~ ~e1ei~ flanots efli to cont~ix~ze the ~ieX

There appears to be confi~encs that ~oxth Viet~a~a can live vith

the p~eant ~pea eM scale oX attack aM can also increase t~

atto.ckers ioea~n ~he princi~l ec~Le cost to Banot baa

been the 4twezzi~ of ~upo~er alt?~i ~.e estlicate that~ the

diversion rew4~ its peak in late 1965, ~M ~r n~ be dee1~~~~iig.

Losses to the.~e a3~ct certa1.n3~r vlcvea by Banots

19-

leaders as toleThbk~ c~ven ~t is at stale in t.~ ~.r.

b~1zi or isfiltration routes has not resuitcd in shorta8eS of

~tertei fDr the fozces in South Tietnen, or adficant~y

redu~e~ Hsaots sb11–~ to ~intsia lc~&stic auppoxt of these

forces. It se~a ~~ t~t the aix ee~aj~ ~ itself eannat

~reua~e Banot to &~m the vex. Other ftctors ~ould ~eS.~h ~eh

~~re heavii~ in the ~rtb Viet~se 3sa~ers appraisal of the-

pr~pccts of victory aM therefore 1~ t~t~ their ~i11 to

VaX~t.

~O. 3az~i has aven seen political adveixtage in the ~orbing

c~st~xi. To~etbar vith its silica aM supporters it has used

the b~1x~ to discredit the ~ effort in Vi~thws. The

piopo~ands to ~~e int tloua*, press~e on the ~ to de~izt

fx~ bu~bix~g is- doubt seen as a neans of ~iersue41n~ the t~ to

alter is uar alma. There is ~ ~ersussive evidence at this time

that a bait to the b~thg vo~U ~goduce a Ccv~unist save fox a

tr~e eM negotiatious. Dt~ consi.derat$.~ ~ou1d figure sore

ix~portant)1, in ~srt1cni~ the C~mist jud~t estÆ likely

political de1e]D~ent~ in the vale of a truce.

.~2O..

AI~T1VZ ~___

31. The ~ioa at trying i~ a tacoxeble political settle

sent tlixoägh ~tiati~ is prdbab3y given periodic causUeratiou

in Hanoi. Tbi~ it baa been rejected so baa probably been àue,

at laact in pert, to a deep auswtciou at tb~ eutire ccmee~t at

achieving Re.n~ts ~a tbrou~ p~Utinil bozining a ~uspiciou

well gr~ed in ~ Haxtb T1e~ae ~t re.~xd aa the sell

~zt or ibair ~ntereeta in 190. Korea,ez, %b~i~ zyobxtic~a~

~rstiq~e inpeia tovard a decisive vietory ii~ tbr~ t)~fr

Osen ~,1litary in the field rather then a qua)lfted TictoIx7 wou at

the c~feTence +~1%14 with the help at other~ Thcuktt they

pr~eb31y reco~ntse that a decisive victory is n~t ~w in 5i~tit, ther

pe~obab]y still hope that persist~ce in a protracted tiar ~.i1l

bring the t~ to vi~rai! ~ eo~seut to. sØtfl~nt c1aar~y

~vantageous to ~wioi

32. The only other cir~tenees in vhich Th~nôi aee~s ~flr~ly

to negotiate would be those in whiCh it c~ to be31~ve that its

ai~ in South Tibt~ were sctiaXly beizg ~ej~iced by c~ztinued

imr and t2iat s i tiated political a~~nt offered a Æbance

to preserve its aa&ets there, ~ ~se in a purely political.

21

-I

ô~ in a ~u rlu~i~ atte~t ]ate.r~ At preseu~

there is n~ c~1p~ i~Micatt~ timt such a turzzin~ in ~auois

attt~e is in the oUiug, bet this cuuld c~ at a~ time and

~e ~,ou1d be tm14~]y to have edva~e~ 1~icatiu~s o it in ~

33. Az,other tactor bearths ~ the t~e o~ fletPt~fltt~5 is

the 1~1uence of Rwtits afltes.. The ar~nt is often ~.de that

1~cioeou ~,j11 eventt~31y ~er~3o ~v~t to tettle tim ~r, in Order

to re~ovo V1e~~ the Iexnattcsial ~a and get ~ iith

the b tnesv of 1iqui~atimg the ca]d uar. In fact, the Soviet

~ttitnde to~mrd the uar ~ears to be m1x~d ~be SovietS can

see :oxtain nd te,~i~s in the prObi1~ iibich the ~er .~enerates

for US pu]ic~, eepcci~3~ in~ On the other band, they are

~are t~t the sitsatf~~ xls]t at d1rec~ c~frc~tatiso

vith the 1~, ihich tb~ vish to avoid. 7ee the Soviets, the

opti ~tc~ vcula be ~ in vbich a po~.tttce3. process, perbais

i1~l6~g ue~łtiatt~t, ~e ~T~ot a good prospect at achieving

its aims in Soitth Yietnon; this noold 4~fl1ct a msjor reverse c~

the uS and i~ciz1d vim credit fOr the ~R in the izteT~ti~1

C~watst ~iov~ent, perhaps evan to the detriment at P~4~g

22-

Ev1d~zUy the Soviets do not~ t~t f.be w~v~t has ye c~

In v)ttch they -- set in i~t–ox~ a s~ez~x~io vbieh woubI en~ in

this v~

31i Cb1~~c e~~w~t stew. e~1n~t c~r ~eg~ti~ti ~s been

of the eo~s~t f~etara in the ~ e~ it 5C~ 3.1.ke3y that

~kt~ wU.j e~~ti~ to r~3ect a )alitic.~. s~tt]e~ut aid ~a

or the ts.~tt~. ~zt ~e ~ igrtoxe the ~eUtOU3

~ve1o~ntu in ____ ~ the posstbility t~.t In the ~e*t year

or tvo ~re~t~ In the 3.ee~~p. It doea sot

se~ ilkebr : ~ ~tu~s ~m~ xeg~e, faUov1~g after Mao,

~dU see its Interests In Vi.t aid Ca~zthesst Asia in a~

radica]2~~ dUf&~uI v~. ~t it is possible ~ the denise of

v~a~4 brJ~ 1~uitaAzt zeap~dsa1s, ~bich ~o~t cext~y

have to 1i~1w~e the~question.

35. We o~1~i1e sat ~ that the C~ntste ~e capable

of fighting ~ at 3east another ye~r, bat that they 8xc

~c~beb1y determ(i~ tO do so. In ~ v1e~a, houevez tbe~ faee

i~ort~nt pr6b1~, ~ va believe that the C~~Mst po~–ti.~,

bo~i ~111tex123~ aid pc~ttica12i In South ~1eth!=, ailli deteriorate

~1~~CflET

Zurth~r ~ the Dent~ Yet, Benol has ~ et~g pulitice].

~ncentiveto ~ep the u~ g~i~g, es~eta1~3P ~tt]. it has s~

c1e~er Dot1v~ ftban.t tha s~iltt7 ~ the GTh~, the US Presidential

e1ectio~s, en~ ot bath ~ ~Uey.

S